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Trust, Social Capital and the Coordination of Relationships  
between the Members of Cooperatives – A Comparison between Member-focused 
Cooperatives and Third-party-focused Cooperatives 
Hatak, I, / Lang, R. / Roessl, D. 
Abstract 
In recent years, nonprofit scholars have increasingly studied the phenomenon of social enterprises 
which has become a generic term describing a wider reorientation among third sector 
organizations. The emergence of social enterprises has also led to a dynamic of hybridization and 
broadening in the cooperative sector, similar to an earlier dynamic of “economization”, but this 
time on the other end of the organizational spectrum. This paper aims at developing a fine-
grained conceptual understanding of how this organizational dynamic is shaped in terms of 
member coordination, thus contributing to a more comprehensive theoretical understanding of 
different organizational forms of cooperatives. Specifically, to highlight the difference to 
traditional member-focused cooperatives, the paper introduces the term third-party-focused 
cooperatives for those social enterprises which emphasize economic goals as well as control and 
ownership by a particular community (typically place-based). The key result of the paper is that 
with the shift from member- to community-focus in cooperatives, the main coordination 
mechanism becomes one of norm-based trust on the basis of generalized reciprocity. In contrast 
to traditional maxim-based trust member coordination on the basis of relation-specific 
reciprocity, this enables third-party-focused cooperatives to mobilize bridging and linking social 
capital, facilitating collective action aimed towards the community interest. The findings suggest 
that this identity shift requires a mutual re-positioning between the cooperative and the nonprofit 
sector, in terms of umbrellas as well as regulatory and legislative bodies. 
Keywords cooperatives, governance, reciprocity, social capital, trust  
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Introduction 
There has been renewed political and academic interest in cooperative organizations as 
alternative providers of public and social services in recent years. Deregulation and liberalization 
tendencies have created new opportunities for cooperatives but have also redefined their 
traditional societal role and organizational identity. Traditional cooperatives are member-focused 
in their goal structure as they aim at generating economic benefits primarily for their 
organizational member base. Nevertheless, they constitute a distinct organizational form different 
from organizations in the private, for-profit sector as they are “democratic, member-owned and 
controlled enterprises, in which membership is open to all stakeholders and decisions are taken 
on the basis of one member one vote” (Somerville 2007, p. 13). 
Empirical accounts from different European countries, however, highlight the recent 
emergence of new forms of cooperative organizations, which provide their services to a broader 
community, therefore acting in a quasi-public or community interest rather than being entirely 
member-focused in their activities. Nevertheless, they clearly constitute a cooperative identity as 
democratic, community-owned and controlled organization. Thus, in this paper, we refer to them 
as “third-party-focused cooperatives” to highlight the difference to traditional member-focused 
cooperatives. 
For example, based on case studies from Austria and Germany, Lang and Roessl (2011) 
analyze cooperative initiatives which operate for the benefit of local communities by taking over 
the provision of amenities and services in a neighborhood, such as cafes, shops, and recreational 
facilities. This leads to economic, social and even psychological benefits for all local residents 
arising from increased opportunities for social interaction as well as local volunteering and 
employment opportunities on a small scale. A similar cooperative phenomenon has already 
earlier been observed in the Swedish context (Lorendahl 1996) and more recently in the British 
context (Somerville 2007; Somerville and McElwee 2011). In this respect, Somerville (2007) has 
coined the term “community co-operatives” describing an emerging group of community-led 
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organizations in the United Kingdom which clearly exhibit cooperative principles (such as 
collective member ownership and democratic control), but nevertheless differ in important 
aspects from the traditional cooperatives. Community cooperatives primarily stress the 
organization’s accountability to the local community by improving the quality of life in the area 
through their delivered services (e.g. housing and connected services). Furthermore, membership 
is explicitly related to “residence or employment in a particular geographical area or 
‘community’” rather than linked to a particular economic interest in the cooperative enterprise 
(Somerville 2007, p. 12f). 
In a similar vein, the European research stream on social enterprises has highlighted the 
emergence of forms of registered cooperatives which provide services to a broader community as 
well as acting in a general societal interest rather than being entirely member-focused in their 
activities (Kerlin 2006; Defourny and Nyssens 2008). These cooperative initiatives often fill the 
gap left by the withdrawal of the state and focus on satisfying social needs (Gonzales 2007; 
Kerlin 2013). The concentration of activities of these cooperatives operating, for example, in 
Italy, the United Kingdom, Scandinavian countries, Greece, or Portugal is mostly on the 
reintegration of disadvantaged persons into the labor market or on the provision of personal 
services (Defourny 2001).   
Taking into account their explicit aim to provide goods and services for the benefit of the 
community by mobilizing a variety of resources, ranging from donations and voluntary work to 
governmental subsidies, and from market operations, as outlined by the aforementioned 
examples, we argue that these third-party-focused cooperatives represent hybrids between 
traditional cooperatives and nonprofit organizations, combining key characteristics of both 
organizational forms (Defourny 2001; Mancino and Thomas 2005; Spear and Bidet 2005). In line 
with the understanding of social enterprises as representing an organizational continuum 
(Defourny 2001), we would thus define third-party-focused cooperatives as those social 
enterprises which emphasize the entrepreneurial and economic initiative as well as control and 
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ownership by the members of a particular community (typically place-based or within a specific 
geographical area) who benefit from their services and reinvested surpluses (Lang and Roessl 
2011; Somerville and McElwee 2011). In other words, these social enterprises rather stress their 
cooperative character, e.g. democratic member control, than their nonprofit organizational 
elements, e.g. the primacy of social objectives (Defourny 2001).  
As Laville and Nyssens (2001) point out, the emergence of social enterprises – and thus also 
third-party-focused cooperatives as one particular type – should not be seen as a conceptual break 
with traditional organizational forms in the third sector but essentially signals a new dynamic of 
hybridization and broadening which is taking place in the sector. Our article builds on this 
observation and aims to develop a better conceptual understanding of how this organizational 
dynamic of hybridization is shaped in terms of member coordination. Whereas nonprofit scholars 
have increasingly studied and conceptualized the phenomenon of social enterprises, we believe 
that within the research tradition of cooperatives, a more thorough conceptual understanding of 
different cooperative organizational forms is needed. Specifically, from an organizational 
theoretical point of view, the shift from benefitting members to third parties might seem like a 
simple variation of the collective character of cooperatives, leading to “very subtle distinctions 
between social cooperatives and many traditional cooperatives” (Young and Lecy 2014, p. 1320). 
However, in this paper, we would argue that the coordination mechanisms of member-focused 
cooperatives and third-party-focused cooperatives are of a fundamentally different nature.  
Theoretical socio-economic approaches towards cooperatives have traditionally highlighted 
two concepts which are considered crucial for understanding the distinctive nature of cooperative 
organizations (Draheim 1952; Toennies 1963; Valentinov 2004; Nilsson and Hendrikse 2011). 
On the one hand, there is a wide range of literature relating cooperatives to trust as a coordination 
mechanism. On the other hand, cooperatives are described as organizations building on social 
capital. Consequently, Christoforou and Davis (2014, p. 6) recently called for fine-grained 
research on how social capital, trust and reciprocity mutually affect each other. Therefore, this 
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paper aims at answering the following research question: How do the member coordination and 
therefore the interplay of social capital, trust and reciprocity differ between member-focused 
cooperatives and third-party-focused cooperatives? By linking the concepts of social capital – 
taking into account different types (bridging/linking and bonding social capital) – and trust – 
relating different types of trust (namely instrumental, maxim-based and norm-based) to different 
reciprocity types (namely transaction-specific, relation-specific and generalized) – we aim at 
distinguishing member-focused and third-party-focused cooperatives on the basis of their 
respective coordination mechanisms.  
Thus, this article contributes to the ongoing discussion on the theoretical conceptualization of 
both cooperatives and social enterprises (Borzaga and Tortia 2006; Defourny and Nyssens 2010; 
Kerlin 2006; Poledrini 2015; Valentinov 2013; Young and Lecy 2014). Previous work has shown 
that neo-institutional economic theory, although widely applied in nonprofit studies, can neither 
adequately explain the existence of traditional, nor third-party-focused cooperatives as a type of 
social enterprise (Borzaga and Defourny 2001; Laville and Nyssens 2001; Dart 2004). Building 
on this fundamental insight, this article continues the work of previous studies on nonprofit and 
civil society governance in general (Steen-Johnson, Eynaud and Wijkstroem 2011; Stone and 
Ostrower 2007), the nature of member-focused and third-party-focused cooperatives in particular 
(Lang and Roessl 2011; Somerville and McElwee 2011; Roessl and Hatak 2014), and their 
relation to social capital and trust (Degli Antoni and Portale 2011). 
The conceptual argument that we want to put forward in this paper is that different forms of 
cooperatives have to be seen as organizations built on different types of trust and social capital. 
Our integrative approach aims at overcoming the risks of conceptualizing cooperatives as either 
purely trust-based or purely social-capital-based organizations. Rather, we hypothesize that there 
are linkages between these two conceptualizations. However, in order to make this relation 
explicit, it is necessary to untangle the concept of social capital and distinguish between a 
structural (or network-based) and a relational dimension rather than taking the alternative view 
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that social capital is more of an overarching concept consisting of both networks and trust. 
Likewise, it is necessary to distinguish between different types of trust as mechanisms for the 
coordination of member relationships in cooperatives by referring to the theory of reciprocity. 
On the practical level, a key implication of our research is that the emergence of social 
enterprises poses challenges and opportunities for traditional cooperative and nonprofit 
organizations and sector umbrellas, as well as for legislative and regulatory bodies in these fields. 
On the other end of the spectrum, a similar broadening of the cooperative identity has earlier been 
discussed as an “economization” or “degeneration” dynamic where cooperatives have gradually 
taken on elements of capitalistic enterprises. The emergence of third-party-focused cooperatives, 
as a type of social enterprise, might thus seem like a re-orientation towards the original 
cooperative identity but at the same time requires a re-positioning towards the nonprofit sector. 
In the next section, we first discuss the specific nature of cooperatives from a social capital 
perspective. Thereby, we will see that the relational dimension of social capital points to the 
relevance of social and moral obligations for coordinating relations between cooperative 
members. In section 3, based on the analysis of the deficits of the classical coordination 
mechanisms, market and hierarchy, trust is presented as a third ideal-typical mechanism for 
coordinating cooperative relations. The discussion of the effectiveness of trust concerning the 
establishment and maintenance of highly complex transaction relationships based on long-term 
objectives leads to the delineation of relationship-related maxim-based trust and context-related 
norm-based trust. In section 4, the two separate streams of discussion on social capital and on 
trust in the context of cooperatives are related to each other. Finally, section 5 discusses 
implications associated with our findings. 
 
Social Capital in the Context of Cooperative Organizations 
Despite the lack of an established definition, there is consensus among scholars that on a 
generic level, the notion of social capital broadly refers to resources embedded in networks which 
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can be mobilized through social interactions and can thus lead to potential benefits for individual 
and collective actors (Brunie 2009). As a societal resource, social capital also enables collective 
action towards the public interest, e.g. at the neighborhood level (Degli Antoni and Portale 2011; 
Evers 2001; Gonzales 2007; Pestoff 2009; Putnam 2000). It can even create positive spillover 
effects on the local and regional economy and civil society (Putnam 1993; Spear 2000).  
As a cooperative can be regarded as a social group or community (Draheim 1952; Kogut and 
Zander 1996; Nilsson and Hendrikse 2011; Toennies 1963), this article focuses on social capital 
in cooperative organizations, where it facilitates collective action and can thus be beneficial to 
both the individual members and the organization (Andrews 2010; Leana and Van Buren 1999; 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).  
For analytical purposes, we can distinguish between the following two components of social 
capital in cooperative organizations, which are in reality, however, inseparable1 (Andrews 2010; 
Krishna and Uphoff 2002; Moran 2005; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Rutten, Westlund and 
Boekema 2010; Valentinov 2004): First, the structural dimension refers to the connections 
among the members of a cooperative organization and especially highlights the role of network 
configuration (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). These linkages provide cooperative members with 
access to other members and the possibility of resource exchange. While some authors highlight 
the role of a dense network structure for social capital building (e.g. Coleman 1990), others point 
to the significance of structural holes and weak ties (e.g. Burt 1992). This pure structuralist 
position, however, is not concerned with the “quality” of social relations and the question of what 
is underlying the resource exchanges in a network (Rutten, Westlund and Boekema 2010). 
Second, the relational dimension reflects “the capability for resource exchange” (Andrews 2010, 
p. 586) between the members of a cooperative organization. The transactions occurring between 
individuals in a cooperative network have to be coordinated by reciprocal social and moral 
obligations in order for resource mobilization and capitalization on social relations to be enabled 
(Adler and Kwon 2002).  
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Member-based organizations, such as cooperatives, obtain vital resources from their members 
(Valentinov 2004; Zerche, Schmale and Blome-Drees 1998), such as access to buying markets in 
the case of marketing cooperatives, to sales markets in the case of purchasing cooperatives, to 
workforce in the case of producer cooperatives, etc. Therefore, founding and maintaining a 
cooperative requires a group of potential members who would be able to provide the organization 
with resources which they would access and mobilize through social ties. Thus, cooperatives, in 
contrast to for-profit organizations, can be seen as organizations that mainly build on the social 
capital of all their members, who are highly committed to a common goal, as their key resource 
(Spear 2000; Valentinov 2004). Even in for-profit enterprises, social capital can exist to a certain 
degree with the benefit of reducing transaction costs (Laville and Nyssens 2001). However, given 
their goal-structure, for-profit organizations have to count first and foremost on the owners and 
central managers to mobilize social capital to improve productivity, as it is in their financial 
interests. 
The important role that social capital plays for organizational development in the cooperative 
sector is shared with social enterprises in their ideal-typical form (Laville and Nyssens 2001). 
However, a key difference is that the latter have a wider community orientation in providing their 
services, especially when compared to traditional member-focused cooperatives. Laville and 
Nyssens (2001, p. 328) highlight that this focus on public benefit in their economic projects 
makes social enterprises attractive for stakeholders who are driven by the idea to contribute to 
society as a whole which in turn provides the organization with “specific forms of mobilisation of 
social capital such as involvement of volunteers, donations and development of local 
partnership.” In contrast, cooperatives are limited to their member base when mobilizing social 
capital, at least in their traditional form as organizations primarily oriented towards the creation 
of member benefits. And it is only by strengthening the social group of members that 
cooperatives can make the mobilization and use of social capital for organizational purposes 
possible (Bowles and Gintis 2002; Enjolras 2009; Evers 2001; Zhao 2011). Nonprofit research 
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has early on highlighted this social embeddedness of cooperative organizations, as put forward in 
Draheim’s concept of the dual nature of cooperatives (Draheim 1952) or Toennies’ work on 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (Toennies 1963). Scholars writing in the tradition of these classic 
sociological approaches also stress the concept of trust when referring to the dominant behavioral 
logic in cooperative societies (Nilsson and Hendrikse 2011). 
However, previous studies have not been able to entirely clarify the relationship between trust 
and social capital (see e.g. Adler and Kwon 2002; or Brunie 2009) – two concepts which appear 
to be crucial to understand the distinctive nature of cooperative organizations. For some authors 
trust is a source (Knoke 1999; Putnam 1993), for others it is an outcome (Lin 1999) of social 
capital. Some authors even equate trust with social capital (Fukuyama 1995) or consider it a 
specific type of social capital (Coleman 1988). Therefore, we further delve into the specific 
nature of trust as the central coordination mechanism in cooperative relationships, and its 
linkages with the structural and relational dimensions of social capital2, by referring to reciprocity 
considerations, with a norm of reciprocity making “two interrelated […] demands: (1) people 
should help those who have helped them, and (2) people should not injure those who have helped 
them” (Gouldner 1960, p. 171, cit. Belmi and Pfeffer 2015, p. 37).  
 
Trust in the Context of Cooperative Organizations 
The advantages of cooperative relationships arise from the functioning coordination of the 
members’ behavior. Only when each member in a cooperative relationship forgoes short-term 
opportunism in favor of common long-term objectives can the cooperative relationship lead to 
advantages for each member (Hatak, Fink and Frank, 2015; Roessl 1996). How is it, then, that 
members are able to ensure that their partners in the cooperative relationship behave according to 
the rules stipulated ex ante? In this regard three ideal-typical governance mechanisms can be 
distinguished: (1) spontaneous behavioral governance on the basis of the market mechanism, (2) 
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hierarchical or mechanistic governance on the basis of regulation and sanctions, and (3) 
heterarchical governance on the basis of trust (Adler 2001; Osterloh and Weibel 2000).  
From the transaction cost economics perspective, market and hierarchy possess “distinctive 
strengths and weaknesses, where hierarchy enjoys the advantage for managing cooperative 
adaptations and the market for autonomous adaptations” (Williamson 2005, p. 6). The 
coordination capacity of the market mechanism originates from the self-organization of the 
individual market members, who strive to realize their own interests as quickly as possible. Thus, 
this mechanism overcomes any uncertainty about the other’s behavior as the actors know that the 
other will behave opportunistically. However, as the ideal-typical market functions only in 
timeless situations (simultaneous exchange), the market mechanism focuses on the pursuit of 
short-term advantages, as it cannot ensure that the exchange partners will refrain from behaving 
opportunistically. Thus, it cannot be the dominant coordination mechanism in long-term 
transaction relationships such as in cooperatives (see e.g. Ouchi 1979).  
Behavioral determination by hierarchical governance (Noorderhaven 1995) is equally limited 
with respect to cooperatives. Credible sanction threats require sufficient sanctioning powers on 
the part of the members, as well as the ex-ante knowledge of the desired behavior of the partner 
and its consequences (Eberl 2004) and the ex-post observation of the actual behavior (Spremann 
1990). However, due to the heterarchical structure of the ideal-typical cooperative, “hierarchy”, 
or in other words, overcoming the short-term orientation of market-based interactions by 
restricting the leeway for opportunistic behavior, is not applicable as a dominant coordination 
mechanism within cooperatives.  
Therefore, as classical transaction-cost theory refers to market and hierarchy as the only ideal-
typical coordination mechanisms, it encounters difficulties in explaining the governance of 
cooperative relationships (Roessl 1996; Valentinov 2004). Cooperatives can be sufficiently 
coordinated neither – due to their long-term orientation – by the market mechanism nor – due to 
the absence of a hierarchical authority – by hierarchy (Lang and Roessl 2011; Moulaert and 
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Nussbaumer 2005). Therefore, a mechanism other than market or hierarchy has to be in place for 
coordinating the relationships between cooperative members (Furubotn 2001). 
As an alternative mechanism, ‘trust’ (e.g., Adler 2001; Fink and Kessler 2010; Hatak and 
Roessl 2011; Sabatini, Modena and Tortia, 2014) has been suggested for coordinating highly 
complex and uncertain cooperative relationships. In order to further develop the line of argument 
of Osterloh and Weibel (2000), and respectively Adler (2001), a differentiation between 
instrumental, maxim-based and norm-based trust is required. 
Instrumental trust can be specified as behavior based on rational considerations (Luhmann 
2000). The trustor trusts the trustee because of control and sanctions. Any behavior other than the 
expected is less attractive for the trustee. In other words, the costly sanctions in place for a breach 
of trust exceed any potential benefits from opportunistic behavior, reducing the uncertainties 
regarding the behavior of the other (Bradach and Eccles 1989) – thus, the trustor’s trust is 
legitimated. Based on inequity aversion models of fairness and other reciprocity approaches 
(Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Fehr and Schmidt 1999), relationships based on instrumental trust 
are based on transaction-specific reciprocity – i.e. the transaction partners evaluate the single 
transaction solely on the basis of transaction-related costs and benefits (Falk and Fischbacher 
2006). Such relationships can also be considered as “cooperation without any benevolence.” In 
these relationships, generosity and gratitude are not at all the underlying motivations of the actors 
(Bruni 2008; Poledrini 2015). Or, as Falk and Fischbacher (2006, p. 310) put it, “Distributive 
consequences of an action alone trigger reciprocal actions.” Therefore, some have raised the issue 
that instrumental trust is not trust at all, or that it could be seen as trust at its narrowest bandwidth 
(Luhmann 2000; Sitkin and Roth 1993). As instrumental trust requires controllable behavior and 
definable outcomes (for contingent claim contracts, see Heide and John 1988), this mechanism is 
confronted with organizational failure in the case of complex cooperative arrangements. Thus, 
instrumental trust is congruent with hierarchical coordination. Therefore, we refrain from using 
the term “instrumental trust” but rather use the label “hierarchical coordination.”  
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Referring to maxim-based trust, the trustor neglects the existing latitude of opportunistic 
behavior of the other, because the actors expects the other not to strive for short-term advantages 
but to behave as agreed upon in order not to endanger the potential valuable relationship. These 
mutual expectations arise from the actors’ evaluations of the relationship based on relation-
related costs and benefits, i.e. relation-specific reciprocity3 (Enjolras 2009, p. 764). From a 
reciprocity theory perspective (Falk and Fischbacher 2006), relation-specific reciprocity shows 
clear similarities to Fehr, Fischbacher and Gaechter’s (2002) concept of “strong reciprocity” (see 
also Gintis 2000). Strong reciprocal relationships are driven by the expectations of the actors that 
they will receive something in return through the relation (Fehr, Fischbacher and Gaechter 2002). 
Consequently, the transaction partners behave in a cooperative manner, that is, in a way that will 
prove beneficial only if the other does not prey upon them but rather responds cooperatively in 
turn.  
Therefore, maxim-based trust can help to coordinate relationships effectively within member-
focused cooperatives. Repeated cycles of exchange and successful fulfillment of expectations 
strengthen the willingness of the parties to rely upon each other and increase the resources 
brought into the relationship (Lewicki and Bunker 1996; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer 
1998). Therefore, information available to the trustor from within the relationship itself 
constitutes the basis of maxim-based trust (e.g. if the partner behaves as agreed upon, even if 
there is leeway for opportunistic behavior, this can be taken as a signal that this partner – due to 
the perceived future value of the relation – does not want to endanger it). The amount of 
knowledge necessary for trust, based upon experiences gained within relationships, is somewhere 
between complete information and complete ignorance (Simmel 1964). In the case of complete 
information, there is no need to trust, and with complete ignorance there is no basis upon which 
to trust (McAllister 1995). Basically, maxim-based trust draws its coordinating power from the 
advantages that the cooperative arrangement bestows upon its members. Whereas hierarchical 
coordination (instrumental trust) is based on cost-effectiveness considerations, maxim-based trust 
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involves a broader array of resource exchange including socio-emotional support. Repeated 
interactions create expanded resources, including shared information, status and concern. These 
expanded resources can, in turn, enable the development of a psychological identification 
(Gaertner, Dovidio and Bachmann 1996).  
The member-focused cooperative’s members may come to characterize themselves in relation 
to the other members, or to the organization, as “we”, and may derive expressive benefits from 
being part of their cooperative (Borzaga and Sforzi 2014). In that way, the value of the members’ 
relationships with their cooperative increases, thus benefitting the level of maxim-based trust. 
Nevertheless, as maxim-based trust is based on the value of the relationship, it cannot explain the 
behavior of cooperatives that focus on the advantages to third parties.  
In contrast, norm-based trust is intrinsically motivated: The trustor trusts the trustee because of 
collective norms embedded in a concrete spatio-temporal context. A norm is a socially defined 
right of others to control an individual’s action (Coleman 1990). The societal embeddedness of 
cooperative members has already been recognized in the classic cooperative literature by 
Draheim (1952), who mentions shared religious beliefs, neighborhood attachment, class 
consciousness and even philanthropic values as crucial factors that connect the members of 
cooperatives (Valentinov 2004). In this regard, shared norms can be seen as “a basis for trust 
between actors, because they imply a high degree of taken-for-grantedness which enables shared 
expectations even between actors who have no […] history of interaction. In the first instance, 
this approach is based on the phenomenological assumption that actors are ‘looking at the world 
from within the natural attitude’ (Schuetz 1932, 1967, p. 98) relying on […] the validity of 
institutionalized rules, roles and routines” (Moellering 2006, p. 373). Therefore, norm-based trust 
involves the development of shared interpretative schemes and place-bounded norms to which the 
actors refer in cooperative interaction (Sydow 1998). In this regard, Sabatini, Modena and Tortia 
(2014), in an empirical study conducted in the Italian province of Trento, show that cooperatives 
with their democratic and participatory structures, unlike any other type of enterprise, allow their 
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members to share and diffuse feelings of social trust and norms of reciprocity. In fact, norm-
based trust stems from the trustor’s and trustee’s interpretation of the social context in which their 
relation is embedded (Moellering 2005). Citizenship behavior from the cooperative’s members is 
characteristic of norm-based trust (Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchinson and Sowa 1986; Organ 
1990). This is because norms are more likely to be internalized when an individual clearly 
identifies with a particular group (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995). Thus, only norm-based 
trust can coordinate relations within third-party-focused cooperatives and explain community-
based enterprises. In fact, by building a community-based sense of reciprocity among their 
members, these cooperatives enable cooperative and trustworthy behavior in the social 
environment (Borzaga and Sforzi 2014).   
Thus, and in line with Poledrini (2015), we argue that norm-based trust is based on generalized 
reciprocity (sometimes labeled as “unconditional reciprocity”, see Bruni 2008). Generalized 
reciprocity as the prevailing mechanism underlying norm-based trust relationships in third-party-
focused cooperatives “constitutes the solidary extreme, referring to transactions that are 
altruistic” (Enjolras 2009, p. 764), so that a trustor can trust a trustee without establishing trust in 
a specific personal relationship (Zucker 1986). In contrast to transaction- and relation-specific 
reciprocity, the reward for generalized reciprocal behavior is provided by the actor himself, 
through his behavior aimed at benefitting third parties. Furthermore, generalized reciprocal 
behavior can coexist with specific reciprocity, which also comes closer to the nature of real-world 
cooperatives (Bruni 2008; Bruni and Porta 2007; Poledrini 2015). 
 
The Synergy Perspective on Social Capital and Trust in Cooperatives  
Bringing in the concept of trust and distinguishing between maxim-based and norm-based 
trust benefits our understanding of how transaction relationships in different types of cooperatives 
are ideal-typically coordinated. In order to build social capital, trust-based transaction 
relationships have to be embedded in a specific network structure (Andrews 2010; Krishna and 
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Uphoff 2002; Moran 2005; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Rutten, Westlund and Boekema 2010; 
Valentinov 2004). In this regard, previous empirical research has shown that trust is significantly 
and positively correlated with social capital in the context of Putnam-esque associations 
(Sabatini, Modena and Tortia 2014). Consequently, and given their distinctive coordination 
mechanisms, we would assume that different types of cooperatives – namely member-focused 
and third-party-focused cooperatives – ideal-typically correspond to specific network structures 
of members, and consequently constitute different types of social capital. In this respect, network 
studies of social capital provide further insights (e.g. Burt 1997; Hurlbert, Haines and Beggs 
2000). Building on the work of Granovetter (1973), we can distinguish between dense, closed 
social networks, made up of “strong” ties between individuals (i.e. a high number of linkages), 
and open networks that have fewer linkages between individuals, and are thus made up of so-
called “weak” ties and “bridges” between disconnected groups (Brunie 2009; Burt 1992).  
As we have already shown, maxim-based trust – the ideal-typical coordination mechanism for 
member relationships in member-focused cooperatives – stems from the relationship itself and, 
more specifically, the repeated cycles of personal exchange that strengthen the willingness of the 
parties to rely upon each other (Lewicki and Bunker 1996; Rousseau et al. 1998). Thus, we would 
assume that dense social networks are a characteristic feature of member-focused cooperatives. In 
contrast, norm-based trust – ideal-typically coordinating the member relationships in third-party-
focused cooperatives – is intrinsically motivated and draws its coordinating power from the 
socio-spatial context of relationships, implying that a trustor can trust a trustee without 
establishing trust in a specific personal relationship (Zucker 1986). Thus, we would assume that 
third-party-focused cooperatives, compared to member-focused cooperatives, are characterized 
by a relatively open network structure in which members have fewer interconnections or “weak” 
ties and maintain “bridges” to external actors (Somerville and McElwee 2011).  
The relation between network structure and trust can be highlighted with an empirical case 
from Germany where a resident cooperative resisted the closure of a public pool in their 
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neighborhood (Lang and Roessl 2011). The initiative started as a small group of activists which 
was committed to establishing a community-based project together. However, they soon realized 
that only through a broadening of their supporter base, they could acquire the necessary monetary 
and self-help resources to turn the public pool into a real community-led project. Over time, 
fundraising efforts and volunteering elements have enlarged the cooperative network and 
established bridging relations between members of different social groups within the 
neighborhood and even beyond its borders.  
As a consequence, drawing on the terminology from development studies (Gittell and Vidal 
1998; Putnam 2000; Woolcock and Narayan 2000), we can characterize the social capital that is 
constituted in member-focused cooperatives as “bonding”, and in third-party-focused 
cooperatives as “bridging” and “linking”. The “bridging” social capital of third-party-focused 
cooperatives, which refers to horizontal linkages, is supported by empirical observations that such 
cooperatives are multi-stakeholder organizations, in the sense of building on community relations 
and associative networks as well as on the integration of users, thus being very much intertwined 
with their local socio-spatial and institutional context (e.g. Lang and Roessl 2011; Spear and 
Bidet 2005; Poledrini 2015). An important contribution in this vein is an empirical study 
conducted by Degli Antoni and Portale (2011) that shows the effect of inclusive participatory 
governance in Italian social cooperatives on employees’ and members’ social capital. In fact, “the 
more the number of stakeholders’ categories involved in the ownership of the cooperative are, the 
higher the impact is on social capital” (Degli Antoni and Portale 2011, p. 572). In contrast, 
linking social capital refers to vertical linkages (Gittell and Vidal 1998; Putnam 2000; Woolcock 
2001) between an organization and people in positions of influence and power in society, such as 
resource holders in regional and national infrastructure bodies, or social investors (Lang and 
Novy 2014). This is clearly a form of social capital as these resources are not mobilized from 
market interactions but rather from trust-based network relations. Linking social capital is crucial 
in the nonprofit sector, given its reliance on institutional fund-raising, but also for social 
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enterprises, such as third-party-focused cooperatives, which develop network contacts to local 
and regional politicians and to external social investors or donors (Hulgard and Spear 2001; 
Lehner 2011). This can be exemplified with reference to an empirical study of two community 
cooperatives in the English housing and regeneration context (Somerville and McElwee 2011). 
The community organizations have benefitted from establishing vertical linkages with 
sympathetic local government bodies and even central government representatives which, for 
instance, facilitated the transfer of valuable assets into the cooperative organization. The 
important role of linking social capital in third-party-focused cooperatives can further be stressed 
by empirical evidence from Austria (Lang and Roessl 2011). Given the clear link between 
economic and social goals, in the establishment of a community-based village shop, local and 
regional government representatives supported the project financially as well as with the 
provision of infrastructure. Although this cooperative practice was embedded in traditional 
structures of a rural community, associated with bonding social capital, “bridges” within the 
neighborhood had to be established with the help of local politicians in order to integrate enough 
volunteer support and donations for the cooperative. The empirical evidence supports our 
theoretical assumptions that third-party-focused cooperatives are characterized by an open 
network structure which helps mobilizing different types of social capital resources. 
Nevertheless, the concrete configuration of the cooperative network and its resources seems to 
depend on the context of the place and the community. 
 
Implications Regarding the Role of the Cooperative Governance Mechanisms for 
Mobilizing and Sustaining Social Capital 
In development studies, social capital is seen as a collective, bottom-up resource that has to be 
stimulated and sustained through formal governance institutions (Brunie 2009; Evans 1997; 
Woolcock and Narayan 2000). Social capital has to be cultivated since, in contrast to financial 
capital for example, it is a highly context-specific organizational asset that cannot easily be 
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transferred through time and space (Andrews 2010; Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon and Very 2007; Burt 
1997; Leana and Van Buren 1999). Thus, the social capital of cooperative organizations 
represents a common-pool resource requiring institutional and governance support (Brandsen and 
Helderman 2012; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom and Ahn 2003). In fact, the governance structure of a 
cooperative (Williamson 1996) is essential for the pooling of the social resources of its members 
through the strengthening of the reciprocity norms that underlie the trust-based relations in 
cooperatives (Enjolras 2009; Sabatini, Modena and Tortia 2014; Spear 2000; Valentinov 2004).  
Thus, in member-focused cooperatives, heterarchical coordination through maxim-based trust 
is rooted in the relation-specific reciprocity stemming from the perceived value of the 
relationship for the individual member (e.g. because the credit cooperative granted me a loan in 
difficult economic circumstances, I return the favor through my continuing engagement in the 
member-focused credit cooperative; I am active in the credit cooperative because I expect this 
engagement to pay off in that the cooperative will support me in the future). For instance, Roessl 
and Hatak (2014), analyzing the ways an Austrian cooperative bank generates value for its 
members, show that members derive value from their membership by having a say in the co-
operative. Furthermore, perceived membership value is derived from the credit cooperative’s 
social commitment towards the community. These perceived membership-related benefits induce 
members to behave in a cooperative manner, that is, they stick to their membership and do not 
switch to other, potentially more favorable providers of financial services.  
In contrast, in the case of third-party-focused cooperatives, the external, community 
orientation is based to a large extent on generalized reciprocity norms, which allow for the 
mobilizing and pooling of resources such as donations or voluntary work that are typical of 
nonprofit organizations. Generalized reciprocity can be understood as a motivation to repay 
generous actions by carrying out actions that are generous or helpful for others (e.g. having 
perceived that I have gained societal support, I return the favor through my engagement in a 
third-party-focused cooperative helping homeless people.). By emphasizing their ideal-typical 
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coordination mechanism, third-party-focused cooperatives have the potential to realize desired 
socio-political effects, which Putnam (2000) prominently highlights for the case of third-sector 
organizations in his social capital theory (Evers 2001). Thus, besides pursuing economic 
objectives, the distinct governance structure based on generalized reciprocity enables third-party-
focused cooperatives to achieve civic objectives as well. Specifically, Degli Antoni and Portale 
(2011) show empirically that it is the inclusive participatory governance that positively influences 
the creation of social capital in terms of generalized trust, which, in our terminology, can be 
interpreted as generalized reciprocity that provides the basis for norm-based trust. Furthermore, 
taking external stakeholders on governance boards is a way to promote bridging social capital 
(Hulgard and Spear 2001). Involving the users, workers and employees as well as an active 
promotion of volunteering and of norms of reciprocity and solidarity within the cooperative and 
beyond its borders in the wider community (Spear and Bidet 2005) provides third-party-focused 
cooperatives with access to resources (Laville and Nyssens 2001; Somerville and McElwee 
2011). 
A governance structure based on maxim-based trust / relation-specific reciprocity for member-
focused cooperatives and norm-based trust / generalized reciprocity for third-party-focused 
cooperatives allow these organizations to approach and develop the resources necessary for 
achieving their specific objectives. This is what, in fact, constitutes the competitive advantage of 
both member-focused and third-party-focused cooperative organizations, as these governance 
mechanisms allow them to mitigate the coordination failures of hierarchy and the market 
(Enjolras 2009; Evers 2001).  
As norms are more likely to be internalized in the case of strong identification with a group, 
growing cooperatives are threatened by governance failure (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen 1994). 
The potential advantages of social-capital-based organizations only hold true for a moderate 
number of members (Bowles and Gintis 2002). With greater size, cooperatives are threatened by 
“degeneration” towards either hierarchical organizations or corporate enterprises (Purtschert 
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1990; Valentinov 2004), implying changes in the organizational culture as outlined by Hogeland 
(2006) for US agricultural cooperatives. Specifically, due to the increasing difficulties regarding 
democratic decision making and the generation of returns on investment in social capital, 
members rather confine themselves to acting as investors or customers (Somerville 2007). In this 
case, the malfunctioning of democratic participation mechanisms, adequate control mechanisms, 
intrinsic incentives for members and the opportunistic behavior of board and management 
undermine the cooperative organization’s reputation for being trustworthy and weaken the 
governing potential of reciprocity norms (Enjolras 2009). However, it is exactly this 
trustworthiness that is critical for the mobilization of social capital. In this regard, Nilsson, Kihlén 
and Norell (2009), in an empirical survey among members of a large traditional Swedish 
cooperative, show that when members consider the cooperative to be too large and too complex 
to be controlled by the membership, the members’ satisfaction and involvement levels decrease, 
which in turn is associated with poor trust in the cooperative board and management. In line with 
this result, Feng, Friis and Nilsson (2015) show empirically that the larger the cooperative, the 
lower the social capital, expressed in terms of members’ involvement, trust, satisfaction, and 
loyalty.  
Nevertheless, Nilsson, Kihlén and Norell (2009) outline that there might be a possibility that 
the members, in spite of their dissatisfaction, low involvement and lack of trust in the leadership, 
are willing to remodel the cooperative to attain more member control. This consideration can be 
complemented with the earlier mentioned case of a large Austrian cooperative bank – a member-
focused cooperative – which manages to perpetuate a rather vivid democracy as shown by Roessl 
and Hatak (2014). In the course of a differentiated cooperative member-relationship management, 
the cooperative’s implementation of CSR measures creates ideational benefits leading to strong 
organizational commitment and to the enhancement of the membership value, despite the bank’s 
considerable size. However, this case shows the need for traditional member-focused 
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cooperatives to support member interaction and group identification in order to sustain the key 
resource of bonding social capital. 
However, third-party-focused cooperatives are confronted with different size-related 
challenges, as a case of an energy cooperative from Germany suggests (Reiner, Lang and Roessl 
2014). Although the cooperative has economic goals, members are primarily intrinsically 
motivated and do not necessarily expect economic returns from the membership. The normative 
member commitment stems from a collectively shared “green identity”. The governance 
challenge for this third-party-focused cooperative is to constantly address members’ intrinsic 
motives and reciprocal social and moral obligations regarding the wider community in order to 
maintain high levels of member participation as well as volunteering and donating for the 
cooperative. 
 
Key Findings on the Interplay between Reciprocity, Trust and Social Capital for 
Cooperative Member Relationships 
The aim of this paper has been to relate the concepts of trust and social capital to each other in 
order to provide a more holistic understanding of the cooperative enterprise. We have argued that 
there is a relation between specific types of trust that create “the capability for resource 
exchange” (Andrews 2010, p. 586), reciprocity and social capital, and these constellations in turn 
characterize specific ideal-typical cooperative settings. More specifically, distinguishing between 
maxim-based and norm-based trust – which are respectively the result of reliable adherence to 
relation-specific reciprocity and generalized reciprocity norms – benefits our understanding of 
how trust coordinates the actions of members of different organizational forms of cooperatives 
that are characterized by specific network configurations that build specific types of social 
capital. In this regard, we differentiate between dense social networks made up of strong-ties, as 
in member-focused cooperatives, and open networks made up of weak ties, as in third-party-
focused cooperatives. Consequently, from a synergy perspective of networks and trust, member-
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focused cooperatives can primarily mobilize bonding social capital, which facilitates collective 
group action towards the mutual interest. In contrast, third-party-focused cooperatives, as a type 
of social enterprise, can primarily mobilize bridging and linking social capital, facilitating 
collective action aimed towards helping third parties and the community interest. Building on 
previous taxonomies (Enjolras 2009; Poledrini 2015; Valentinov 2004), Table 1 summarizes our 
discussion on the proposed linkages between the concepts of reciprocity, trust and social capital 
in order to distinguish between cooperative enterprises on the basis of their respective 
coordination mechanisms.  
Table 1: Ideal-typical delineation of organizational arrangements  
and theirrespective coordination mechanisms 
Organizational 
arrangement 
single transaction 
member-focused 
cooperatives 
third-party-focused 
cooperatives 
Prevailing type of 
reciprocity 
transaction-specific 
reciprocity 
relation-specific 
reciprocity 
generalized 
reciprocity 
Prevailing type of 
trust 
instrumental trust maxim-based trust norm-based trust 
Prevailing type of 
social capital 
---- 
bonding social 
capital 
linking / bridging 
social capital 
Network structure ---- 
closed network 
structure / strong ties 
between members 
open network 
structure / weak ties 
between members 
 
At this point, it should be noted that these considerations are based on ideal-typical 
constellations. With a view on the cooperative landscape one has to take into account that these 
constellations overlap, resulting in a variety of mixed forms. For example, there can to some 
extent be maxim-based trust between strongly tied members of a third-party-focused cooperative, 
while members of member-focused cooperatives can to some extent develop norm-based trust. 
The empirical examples provided in the paper seem to support this assumption. 
 
Conclusions 
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Specific coordination mechanisms and the resulting social capital have to be sustained as they 
are highly context-specific organizational assets that cannot easily be transferred through time 
and space. In this respect, we have already outlined some implications of our findings for the role 
of cooperative organizations as a formal institutional governance arrangement that is designed to 
enhance the mobilization, reproduction and protection of forms of trust and social capital. In 
traditional member-focused cooperatives the managerial focus should ideal-typically be on 
strengthening the perceived value of the relationship for the individual member in order to sustain 
maxim-based trust which is based on relation-specific reciprocity and which subsequently leads 
to the mobilization of bonding social capital for the organization. Even with greater size, 
traditional member-focused cooperatives might be able to sustain bonding social capital through 
innovative forms of membership value creation as one of the empirical cases in the paper has 
shown.  
In contrast, in third-party-focused cooperatives, generalized reciprocity norms and therefore 
norm-based trust should be strengthened by the cooperative’s management, which allow for 
mobilizing bridging and linking social capital. This can be done by highlighting the cooperative 
benefits for the wider community and for the place where the cooperative is situated and 
supported by different stakeholder groups. The focus on public benefits in their economic 
projects makes third-party-focused cooperatives attractive for different stakeholder groups who 
are driven by the idea to contribute to the community and place. 
However, the empirical evidence presented suggests that the reality of cooperative practice is 
not always that clear-cut. In fact, the findings imply that bonding social capital can play a role for 
third-party-focused cooperatives too, especially in initial stages. Moreover, in order to keep the 
traditional cooperative principles of member-ownership and member-control with greater 
cooperative size alive, strengthening bonding social capital may be still needed to some extent, 
besides addressing members’ intrinsic motives and reciprocal social and moral obligations 
regarding the wider community. Thus, a central implication is that a critical balance of different 
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forms of trust and social capital in third-party-focused cooperatives can only be achieved and 
sustained in place-based communities. In general, the right mix of different forms of social 
capital depends on the concrete context of a community as well as the goals of the cooperative 
initiative. 
The wider implications of our research are that the emergence of social enterprises organized 
as cooperatives poses challenges and opportunities for traditional cooperative and nonprofit 
organizations and sector umbrellas, as well as legislative and regulatory bodies in these fields. On 
the other end of the spectrum, a similar broadening of the cooperative identity has earlier been 
discussed as an “economization” or “degeneration” dynamic where cooperatives have gradually 
taken on elements of investor-driven organizations, with trust and social capital losing their 
importance. The emergence of third-party-focused cooperatives, as a type of social enterprises, 
might thus well be seen as a re-orientation towards the original cooperative identity but at the 
same time requires a re-positioning towards the nonprofit sector. 
Key implications of our research for the scientific community relate to differentiating between 
bridging/linking and bonding social capital, and further delineating between different types of 
trust and reciprocity in order to improve our understanding of the multifaceted reality of the 
organizational forms that exist in the cooperative landscape. Thus, this paper provides a 
theoretical conceptualization of cooperative enterprises by bringing together the social-capital-
related and trust-related research in a cooperative context. So far, the cooperative phenomenon 
has mainly been discussed separately along these two streams.  
Based on the framework developed in this paper, member-focused and third-party-focused 
cooperatives should be analyzed with respect to their coordination mechanisms along the life 
cycle including growth in terms of member number, so as to bring to light the dynamic interplay 
of specific reciprocity norms, trust, and social capital. Such preferably qualitative longitudinal 
research efforts could, finally, lead to a more comprehensive taxonomy of organizational 
arrangements with respect to their underlying coordination mechanisms.  
25 
 
Furthermore, future research should operationalize the concepts of norm-based and maxim-
based trust as well as the associated generalized and relation-specific reciprocity to lay the 
foundations for quantitative studies testing the findings regarding the differences between 
member-focused and third-party-focused cooperatives, also for different country and sector 
contexts which might reveal differences in the interplay of reciprocity norms and trust.  
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Notes 
1 The view that there are essentially two components of social capital is shared by many authors 
in the field, although the names for these two elements differ. Thus, Grootaert and Bastelaer 
(2002) distinguish between a structural and a cognitive form, whereas Valentinov (2004), for 
instance, differentiates between a structural form of social capital and its “content”. 
2 Instead of dividing the argument between social capital (as a network concept) and trust in the 
following paragraphs, one alternative view and line of argument regarding the relationship 
between social capital, networks and trust would be that social capital is more of an overarching 
concept. However, as outlined in the introduction, this paper tries to fill a research gap in the 
literature (Christoforou and Davis 2014) by integrating these two particular approaches towards 
conceptualizing cooperatives, as either trust-based or social-capital-based organizations. Hence, a 
division between these two discourses seems to be appropriate in the first step of our argument. 
3 In contrast to Enjolras (2009, p. 764), we use the term “relation-specific reciprocity” instead of 
“balanced reciprocity” to underline the distinct nature of the former in referring to direct 
exchange relations versus “generalized reciprocity” which refers to compensation for the benefits 
received from the society and thus justifies altruistic behavior towards others. 
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